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Public Administration is in an era of change. This article aims at re-discovering one under-
researched part of public administration, the executive arms of International Governmental 
Organizations (IGOs). These are referred to as International Executives (IEs). The article 
provides a conceptual mapping and an empirical illustration of three important dynamics of 
IEs – intergovernmental, supranational and transgovernmental dynamics. The study also 
offers a middle-range organization theory perspective that suggests five independent variables 
that foster the advent of supranational and transgovernmental behavior and roles among IE 
civil servants. The variables suggested are (H1) the organizational properties of IEs, (H2) the 
degrees of institutionalization of IEs, (H3) the recruitment procedures of the IEs, (H4) 
characteristics of the relationships between IEs and external institutions, and finally (H5) 
demographic characteristics of the IE civil servants. The empirical illustrations are drawn 
from the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat. The concern 
here is to theoretically account for and empirically illustrate the assumed relationships 
between the five hypotheses and the behavioral dynamics evolving among IE incumbents. 
The article argues that the IEs of the EU, the OECD and the WTO seem to share important 
behavioral dynamics due to several organizational similarities. 
 
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVES1 
Public Administration is in an era of change (Aberback, 2003). Increasingly, executive 
functions, like policy initiation, policy formulation and policy making, are transported from 
national executive institutions to International Governmental Organizations (IGOs).2 
Moreover, governance by IGOs penetrate still more areas and levels of national governance. 
This article aims at re-discovering one under-researched aspect of IGOs - International 
Executives (IEs) - and highlights five factors that impact on the behavior and role perceptions 




of IE incumbents (see Table 2 below). IEs initiate, formulate and influence the policies and 
politics of IGOs, they are lead by a director-general (and sometimes by a political collegium 
as in the European Commission), and they are staffed by civil servants in permanent positions 
as well as on time-limited contracts. IEs are designed to make the IE officials stay loyal to the 
IGO rather than to their country of origin. The question targeted in this study is to what 
extent, how and why IEs challenge the existing Westphalian normative nation-state order 
based on territorial sovereignty (Gourevitch, 2003; Kegley and Raymond, 2002, 192; March 
and Olsen, 1998; Rosenau, 1996).  
 
To answer this question a middle-range organization theory perspective is outlined specifying 
the conditions under which IE officials evoke role perceptions and behavioral patterns that 
transcend intergovernmentalism. The empirical illustrations have explorative ambitions and 
are drawn from the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat – 
the main executive bodies of the three respective IGOs (EU, OECD, WTO). The article 
hereby challenges claims like “comparing the Commission with international 
secretariats…would certainly be of very limited usefulness...” (Christiansen, 1996, 77). 
Arguably, the three IEs studied share some basic organizational features as public interstate 
organizations that are organized according to well-known principles from domestic executive 
institutions and which have overlapping fields of jurisdiction with other IEs. However, these 
three IEs also differ with respect to the size and heterogeneity of membership, their main 
outputs (hard law and soft law), the top leadership of the administrative apparatus, as well as 
with regard to their geographical coverage: the European, industrial and global world, 
respectively. This study theorizes how the formal organization, institutionalization, staffing 
and external embeddedness of IEs impact on the behavioral dynamics among the IE 
incumbents.  





Evidently, the international political scene has become increasingly organized in the post 
WWII period, reflected in the upsurge, institutionalization and impact of IEs (Finnemore, 
1996; March and Olsen, 1998). The task of IEs has become increasingly that of an active and 
independent policy-making institution and less a passive technical servicing instrument for the 
governments (Lemoine, 1995, 28). This article argues that IEs are important, though not 
omnipotent, centers of gravity of most contemporary IGOs.3 However, beyond single-case 
studies there is a surprising dearth of theoretically informed comparative studies of the actual 
internal dynamics of IEs (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Checkel, 2003; Gehring, 2003, 4; 
Gould and Kelman, 1970; Johnston, 2003; Mouritzen, 1990; Reinalda and Verbeek 2004; 
Rochester, 1986). Two main bodies of literature have combined theoretical innovation and 
empirical testing of IE dynamics. The first strand of research was the functionalist and neo-
functionalist studies of the European Commission and the UN Secretary, inspired by Ernst 
Haas (e.g. Alger, 1963; Ernst, 1978; Wolf, 1973). The second body of research is the more 
recent institutionalist and social constructivist literature on organizations like the EU, the 
Council of Europe and NATO (e.g. Checkel, 2003; Zürn, 2003). Neither of these endeavors 
has systematically studied the executive arms of IGOs. Nor have these bodies of literature 
emphasized the relationships between generic organizational properties of IEs and the 
behavioral dynamics of the IE personnel (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986, 761). This study 
advocates that the internal dynamics of IEs may be accounted for by analyzing their 
organizational components (H1), their degrees of institutionalization (H2), their recruitment 
procedures (H3), their relationships with external institutions (H4), and demographic 
compositions of the personnel (H5). The argument forwarded suggests that these 
organizational characteristics foster the emergence of supranational and transgovernmental 
behavioral logics among IE incumbents (see Table 2 below).  





Whereas some scholars picture the nation-state as weakened, hollowed out and fragmented 
due to the advent of IEs (e.g. Rosenau, 1997), others argue that IEs contribute to strengthen 
and integrate the nation-state as a coherent Westphalian system of territorial sovereignty (e.g. 
Biersteker, 2003; Moravcsik, 1998). Moreover, whereas some picture IEs as key motor in the 
transformation of nation-state institutions (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001; Wessels, 
Maurer and Mittag, 2003), others argue that the effects of IEs are moderate and associated 
with evolving dynamics of domestic change (Anderson, 2002; Olsen, 2003a). Such 
conflicting assessments represent more than standard academic turf-battles with regard to 
institutional transformations of political orders. We are in fact facing complex, puzzling and 
poorly understood relationships between IEs and domestic transformation (Bulmer and Burch, 
1998).4 The question posed here is whether IEs are merely instruments for member-states or 
whether they are best conceived as transformative institutions contributing to supranational 
and transgovernmental governance. 
 
Much recent literature assumes that the European Commission represents a critical case of 
transformation among IEs. The argument is that if we do not observe transformational 
dynamics within the European Commission we should not expect similar dynamics within 
other IEs (Johnston, 2003). This assumption is challenged by advocating that IEs are multi-
dimensional administrative apparatuses, embodying contradictions and dilemmas that are 
difficult to solve and that affect how decisions are made. IEs are seldom unidimensional as 
suggested by realist and neo-liberalist theoretical orthodoxy, stressing the intergovernmental 
aspects of IGOs. This article challenges this theoretical orthodoxy by conceptualizing the 
diverse organizational components of IEs. They are not merely neutral tools used by member 
governments to fulfill prefixed preferences; they are also epistemic communities of 




professional experts and socializing institutions that transform nationally oriented elites into 
community minded elites (Checkel, 2003; Haas, 1992; Lemoine, 1995). IEs are multi-
dimensional organizations that should be analyzed by fine-grained operational accounts to 
understand their diverse modus operandi. They live with in-build tensions between at least 
three operational logics: (i) intergovernmentalism, (ii) supranationalism and 
transgovernmentalism (iii). Accordingly, IEs are partly vehicles of nation-state preferences 
(i), partly autonomous supranational institutions with vested interests, visions and drives (ii), 
and partly porous and segmented professional institutions where knowledge is discovered, 
developed, interpreted and spread (iii). This article theorizes conditions under which 
incumbents of IEs are transformed from mere intergovernmental officials into supranational 
and transgovernmental agents. Table 1 suggests three role perceptions that correspond to these 
three IE dynamics. 
 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
 
Arguably, the internal dynamics of IEs are transformed to the extent that the role perceptions 
and behavioral patterns of IE officials move from row (i) to the rows (ii) and (iii) in Table 1. 
Hence, actor transformation implies that IE officials evoke supranational and/or 
transgovernmental behavior and roles (Greenwood and Hinings, 1996). The focus of this 
study is thus on the end-point of actor transformation, not on the process of it (Alderson, 
2001). Moreover, it is also assumed a mutual relationship between actors’ behavior and role: 
Acting in certain ways make actors better equipped to play particular roles, and by playing 
these roles the actor may over time take them for granted. Roles that are taken for granted 
may affect the roles that are played and the behavior evoked. We also suggest that actors are 
strongly transformed if they activate supranational and transgovernmental ways of behavior 




and role perceptions in a more or less routinized fashion (Beyers and Trondal, 2004; Zürn, 
2003). In sum, actor transformation implies that the roles and behavior evoked by IE civil 
servants are less biased by their country of origin than by their routinized supranational and 
professional affiliations, respectively. They become less focused on defending fixed national 
positions than by discovering and pursuing what is perceived as the ‘common good’ 
(supranational role) and scientifically correct (transgovernmental role), respectively.  
 
The article is sequenced as follows: The next section outlines a middle-range organization 
theory approach that suggests five generic variables that are conducive to supranatioanlism 
and/or transgovernmentalism. The next section provides empirical observations of the 
behavior and roles evoked by civil servants of the European Commission, the OECD 
Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat. The concern here is to illustrate the assumed 
relationships between the five hypotheses and the behavioral dynamics among IE officials. 
The discussion concludes that the mix of behavioral and role dynamics within IEs are 
organizationally contingent and more complex than assumed by IR theoretical orthodoxy. IE 
officials are expected to perform increasingly more complex tasks of representation. The 
article highlights that IEs seem to share important behavioral dynamics due to several 
organizational similarities.  
 
A MIDDLE-RANGE ORGANIZATION THEORY APPROACH 
This study departs from a three-fold conceptualization of IEs as intergovernmental, 
transgovernmental and supranational institutions (Simmons and Martin, 2003). According to 
this conceptualization, IEs differ with respect to their degree of institutional autonomy and 
unity, and depending on the type of IGOs they operate within. Traditional intergovernmental 
organizations score low on both items by being non-unitary organizations constructed by 




nation-states and without the authorization to issue binding decisions that go against one or 
several member-states. In addition, intergovernmental organizations uphold the territorial 
logic of the Westphalian order at the international level by a territorial principle of 
organization. IEs governed by a supranational dynamic, by contrast, score high on both items 
by being unitary organizations with autonomous spheres of sovereignty. Supranational IEs 
challenge the territorial logic of nation-state sovereignty by having acquired spheres of 
institutional autonomy (Cortell and Peterson, 2003; Egeberg, 2003b). Finally, IEs governed 
by a transgovernmental dynamic challenge the principle of institutional unity by being 
functionally de-coupled, porous and open institutions staffed by government actors from 
different factions and levels of government – i.e. domestic sector ministries and agencies. 
Transgovernmental IEs have shared institutional jurisdictions with other constituencies, and 
are internally marked by functional and intra-institutional patterns of co-operation and conflict 
(Rosenau, 1997).  
 
This three-fold conceptual map may be transposed into a corresponding conceptual map of the 
behavior and role perceptions evoked by IE officials (see Table 1 above). The 
intergovernmental dynamic implies that IE civil servants evoke national roles focused on 
territorial sovereignty and statehood. The supranational dynamic implies that IE officials 
identify with the IE institution as a whole and act according to what is perceived as the 
‘common good’. Finally, the transgovernmental dynamic implies that IE incumbents 
emphasis functional and professional interests, norms and rules and that they identify with 
their unit and portfolio rather than with the IE as a whole (Aggestam, 1999).  
 
Many students of IEs adopt neo-liberalist and realist approaches and apply principal-agent 
theory to understand the baseline dynamics of IEs (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996). 




Basically, these rationalist accounts focuses on patterns of co-operation and conflict among 
states and see IEs as vehicles for maximizing state preferences and for lowering transaction 
costs. Recent studies of IEs have made a combined ‘institutionalist and constructivist turn’ 
and rediscovered questions of actor socialization, complex learning and cognitive framing of 
norms and rules (Checkel, 2003; Trondal, 2001; Trondal, 2004). IEs are pictured as more than 
empty vessels and neutral arenas in which state representatives gather (Finnemore, 1996, 35). 
An equivalent rediscovery of institutions was made in the field of organization theory twenty 
years ago (March and Olsen, 1984). The independent variables outlined beneath benefit from 
this organizational and institutional school of thought. One additional criterion for selecting 
the independent variables is how successfully they have survived past empirical tests. 
 
Formal organizations provide a codified and normative embodiment of their incumbents. In 
order to understand the process whereby actors adopt particular behavior and roles one has to 
unpack the normative structures surrounding them. Actors are bounded rational with limited 
computational abilities. Formal organizations provide cognitive and normative shortcuts and 
categories that simplify and guide actors’ choice of behavior and role (Simon, 1957). 
Organizations provide cognitive maps that simplify and categorize complex information, offer 
procedures for reducing transaction cost, give regulative norms that add cues for appropriate 
behavior as well as physical boundaries and temporal rhythms that guide actors’ perception of 
relevance with respect to behavior and role (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; March and Olsen, 
1998). Organizations also discriminate among what conflicts that are activated and what 
conflicts that are de-activated (Egeberg 2003b). By organizing civil servants into executive 
organizations within IGOs a system of “rule followers and role players…” are established 
above and beyond domestic executive institutions (March and Olsen, 1998, 952).  
 




Five organizational variables are outlined in the following, specifying conditions under which 
IE officials are likely to adopt supranational and transgovernmental behavior and roles in a 
more or less routinized way (Zürn, 2003). Table 2 reveals how these variables play out in our 
selected cases: the European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat:  
 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
 
H1: Organizational properties 
The first independent variable considered is the core properties of organizations. Formal 
organizations are normative structures “composed of rules and roles specifying, more or less 
clearly, who is expected to do what, and how” (Egeberg, 2003a, 117). Executive 
organizations are organized horizontally and vertically. Two important horizontal principles 
of executive organization are sector/purpose, function and territory (Gulick, 1937). Already 
Robert W. Cox and Harold K. Jacobson (1973) saw the organizational similarities between 
national executive institutions and IEs. According to Wagenen (1971, 5 – original emphasis), 
“[t]he similarities overwhelm the differences between national and international 
administration”. Most executive organizations, both domestic and international, are 
horizontally organized according to the principles of purpose and function. The argument here 
is that IEs organized by purpose and function are likely to accompany decision-making 
behavior and role perceptions that are functionally defined and not biased by territoriality. 
Hence, the territorial principle of Westphalia is transcended by a functional logic. 
  
IEs cover different policy sectors. This article focuses on the trade sector and the research 
sector - two internationally oriented policy domains. Both sectors are covered by the EU, the 
OECD and the WTO, and interwoven by alleged contribution to increased trade and economic 




prosperity (European Commission, 2000). Both sectors have also been increasingly subject to 
regulations and normative standardization from domestic governments and from the EU, 
OECD and WTO (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000; Finnemore, 1996; Woolcock, 2000).  
 
One observation highlighted in previous research is that actors’ roles are likely to be 
transformed in highly issue-specific situations (Zürn, 2003, 20). One reason may be that 
actors tend to be granted a great amount of leeway and autonomy in horizontally sector-
specialized organizations. Sector specialization may accompany the emergence of epistemic 
communities of sector-experts who have shared understandings of causal relationships 
between means and ends, worldviews, roles and norms of appropriate behavior. Arguably, the 
horizontal specialization of IEs by purpose and function accompanies a need for exclusive and 
professional competences in order to act effectively within them. Moreover, such expert 
communities are less bound to territorial borders, and often loosely tied to particular 
organizations (Haas, 1992). Participants in such networks often have life-long commitments 
and careers attached to them, accompanying the emergence of transgovernmental expert roles 
among such officials (Haas, 1990, 42; Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996, 209). This 
argument implies that the WTO Secretariat, the OECD Secretariat and the European 
Commission may activate transgovernmental dynamics due to their horizontal organizational 
issue-specificity. Furthermore, this also implies that, for example, transgovernmental 
dynamics are stronger within DG Trade and DG Research of the European Commission than 
within the European Commission as a whole, and that transgovernmental dynamics are 
stronger within the specialized divisions of the WTO and OECD Secretariats than within the 
Secretariats as wholes. Hence, IE officials are likely to activate behavior and role perceptions 
that reflect their specialized and primary affiliations towards units and divisions to a larger 
extent than their affiliations towards the IEs as wholes.  





Vertically, executive organizations are typically organized according to a specialized structure 
of rank. The European Commission, the OECD Secretariat and the WTO Secretariat are all 
vertically organized (see Table 2). The argument suggested here is that vertically specialized 
IEs have the potential for disciplining and controlling civil servants by hierarchy (Egeberg, 
2003a). Hence, vertically specialized IEs are likely to have stronger impact on incumbents’ 
behavior and role perceptions than less vertically specialized IEs (Bennett and Oliver, 2002, 
425; Egeberg, 2003c, 137; Knight, 1970). Hence, a vertically organized IE that is horizontally 
specialized by sector, like the Commission, may activate transgovernmental and supranational 
behavioral logics by administrative command and individual incentive systems like salary and 
promotion. In sum, vertically specialized IEs that are organized by purpose and function are 
conducive to supranational and transgovernmental behavioral dynamics among the personnel.  
 
H2: Institutionalization 
The second independent variable analyzed is the degrees of institutionalization of IEs. 
Organizations and institutions should not be conflated. The institutionalization of formal 
organizations, whereby they become “infused with value…” strengthens their ability to 
impact on incumbents’ behavior and role perceptions because institutionalized organizations 
have the ability to socialize incumbents towards an embodiment of purpose (Selznick, 1957, 
17). An institution develops its own distinct dynamic (Cox and Jacobson, 1973, 7). “To be 
reckoned as ‘institution’, organizations should have a distinctive identity and a value in their 
own right” (Egeberg, 2003b, 7). Most IE civil servants have multiple institutional affiliations 
– some primary and some secondary to them (see H4). The primary affiliation of IE officials 
is the IE as such – and the departments and units underneath - while their secondary 
affiliations may be domestic government institutions – like ministries and agencies from their 




country of origin – or professional institutions like universities where they are pre-socialized 
to professional life. Arguably, the stronger the institutionalization of primary institutions, the 
weaker the transformative power of secondary (external) institutions, notwithstanding the 
latter’s level of institutionalization. In accordance with this argument, Martha Finnemore and 
Kathryn Sikkink (1998, 893) argue that the influence of domestic (secondary) institutions is 
reduced as the organizational structures of IEs become institutionalized. The next section 
argues that the European Commission is a strongly institutionalized organization, that the 
WTO Secretariat has a medium level of institutionalization and that the OECD Secretariat is 
fairly weakly institutionalized. Accordingly, Commission officials are likely to evoke 
supranational roles and loyalties more strongly than OECD and WTO officials (see Table 2).  
 
H3: Recruitment procedure 
Organizational autonomy is strongly dependent on the recruitment procedures adopted 
because different procedures for recruitment tend to affect actors’ decision-making behavior 
and role perceptions differently (Mouritzen, 1990, 39). Findings suggest that supranational 
loyalties are contingent “on whether one is paid by ones country of origin or by the 
organization…” (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2004, 20). Basically, recruitment may be based on a 
merit principle, as in most Western democracies, and on a quota principle or other systems of 
patronage or parachutage, as in the top echelon of the American civil service (Ingraham, 
1995, 9). Whereas the merit principle recruits neutral, permanent civil servants on the basis of 
competence, the quota principle typically recruits officials on more temporary contracts on the 
basis of, for example, political, sectoral or territorial loyalties (Bekke and van der Meer, 2000, 
281-282; Ingraham, 1995, xix). The argument forwarded here is that, ceteris paribus, the 
merit principle applied to IEs foster supranational and transgovernmental roles and behavior 
more efficiently than the quota principle because there is no inherent territorial logic in the 




meritocratic principle (Bennett and Oliver, 2002, 418). The national connection is upheld 
under the quota principle securing a staff loyal to the domestic constituency. 
Intergovernmental organizations typically employ the quota principle and different systems of 
secondment in order to uphold geographical balances of posts and territorially loyal delegates, 
like in the NATO Secretariat and the UN Secretariat (Bennett and Oliver, 2002, 413; 
Mouritzen, 1990; Reymond and Mailick, 1986). The merit principle is central to the European 
Commission as well as to the WTO Secretariat. This principle secures institutional autonomy 
as far as recruitment to the IE is concerned and henceforth non-territorial loyalties among the 
incumbents. The quota principle is more central in the OECD Secretariat (see Table 2). 
 
Studying officials in IEs implies studying officials who mostly have worked in national 
institutions prior to entering the IEs. This is particularly the case among a segment of the 
European Commission seconded on short-term contracts. The WTO does not employ 
seconded personnel to the same extent as the European Commission. In the WTO, permanent 
positions are the rule. Officials are recruited on the basis of merit, and the personnel tend to 
stay employed in the WTO once they have entered. In the OECD, a large and increasing part 
of the employees are seconded consultants and researchers. Furthermore, in the OECD 
apparatus the term ‘permanent’ has lost its significance since 70 to 80 percent is employed on 
time-limited contracts. The whole OECD secretariat may thus be considered a parallel 
administration (Marcussen, 2002). Assumable, seconded officials are less likely to become 
supranationally oriented than the permanent IE civil servants. 
 
H4: Organizational affiliations 
The fourth independent variable considered is the characteristics of the relationships that may 
develop between organizations. Both rationalist and cognitive accounts of IGOs “have been 




rather silent on the role of domestic factors” (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger, 1996, 221). 
This study stresses the fact that IEs serve as parts of complex webs of organizations, including 
other IEs, member-state institutions, private organizations, etc. Different IEs may have 
institutionalized mutual relationships because of overlapping jurisdictions, overlapping 
members, and histories of co-operation (Cox and Jacobsson, 1973, 382; Haas, 1990, 27). Civil 
servants of IEs have typically multiple institutional affiliations - both nationally and 
internationally – that pose multiple cognitive frames, incentives and norms of appropriate 
conduct (March and Olsen, 1998). We assume that the behavior and role perceptions of IE 
civil servants are a product of their primary (IE) and secondary (external) organizational 
affiliations. Hence, there is a hierarchy of organizational memberships present (Flora, 1999, 
35). The demands that these affiliations pose may conflict thereby inducing role and 
behavioral conflicts among the officials (Barnett, 1993). The status of primary and secondary 
affiliations is measured here by the length and intensity of affiliation to each of them. For 
example, most Commission officials as well as officials of the WTO Secretariat use a 
majority of their time and energy within their DG and Unit (European Commission) or 
specialized divisions (WTO Secretariat), and less towards other institutions. This implies that 
their IE portfolios govern their behavior and role perceptions more strongly than external 
organizations. One effect of intensive and long tenure within IEs is that these institutions 
become “real” in a social psychological sense to the officials. Both students of EU institutions 
and students of mass opinion conclude that actors tend to develop multiple identities, and that 
supranational, national and professional identities supplement each other. Different roles are 
activated in different situations, and they become partly meshed and blended into each other 
over time (Lewis, 2000; Risse and Maier, 2003; Trondal, 2004).  
 




There is an inbuilt tension between a logic of recency and a logic of primacy. Whereas the 
logic of recency implies that recently evoked roles and behavior are likely to be evoked again 
(March, 1994, 70), the logic of primacy entails that roles and behavior that are evoked within 
primary institutions are likely to be enacted in secondary institutions as well. Arguably, the 
logic of recency may trump the logic of primacy if actors engage for long time and interact 
intensively within secondary (external) institutions. The logic of recency is also likely to 
affect actors’ behavior and role if the size of the temporal gap between primary and secondary 
affiliation is sufficient. Hence, the amount of time spent in the secondary institution, and the 
amount of time passing between occupation in the primary and the secondary institution may 
condition the relative importance of the logic of recency and the logic of primacy (Johnston, 
2003, 9). Consequently, permanent IE officials are likely to be affected by a logic of primacy 
whereas IE officials on temporary contracts are more likely to act on the premises of a logic 
of recency.  
 
The logic of primacy is also conditioned by the degree of organizational fit or mis-fit between 
primary and secondary institutions (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001). “[I]nstitutions have 
non-synchronized dynamics” (Olsen, 2003b, 18). Our argument is that the greater the degree 
of organizational mis-fit, the more likely that the logic of primacy is acted upon. For example, 
the territorial logic of domestic foreign policy easily conflict with the sectoral logic of the 
Commission’s research policy. The logic of primacy assumes that Commission officials, 
affiliated to DG Research, think and behave according to their DG portfolio more than 
according to their country of origin. Likewise, long-time employees of the WTO Secretariat 
are expected to think and behave according to their Division’s portfolio more than according 
to their country of origin or other institutional affiliations. Organizational fit is more likely to 




activate a logic of recency among IE officials which implies that supranational and 
transgovernmental behavior and role are only moderately evoked.  
 
One proxy of organizational fit is the principles of horizontal organization of primary and 
secondary organizations (sector versus territory) (Gulick, 1937) (see H1). Stein Rokkan 
(1987, 212) argued that political institutions are often two-dimensional, organized along one 
territorial and one functional axis. One central organizing principle of the General Assemblies 
of IGOs is their territorial organization of political geography, mirroring the spatial 
structuring of state sovereignty. In contrast, the organization of IEs mirrors the sectoral and 
process organization of domestic executive institutions (see H1). The argument is that 
organizational mis-fit, for example between a sectoral and a territorial axis, is likely to 
challenge existing ways of acting and thinking among the civil servants (Egeberg, 2003a). For 
example, civil servants who were previously affiliated to domestic sector ministries (like a 
research ministry) are challenged when entering an IGO organized by territory – like the 
WTO and OECD general assemblies and committee systems.  
       
Finally, the logic of primacy is conditioned by the properties of actor interaction. Actors may 
have dense, moderate or low level of interaction across organizational tiers. Interaction may 
also be formalized or based on informal codes of conduct. Role-change often follows from 
long-term and informal interaction (Lewis, 2003; Olsen, 2003b, 18). However, empirical 
studies of IE participants challenge the assumption that length of participation among IE 
officials accompanies a re-socialization of them (e.g. Ernst, 1978; Trondal, 2001). On the 
other hand, transactionalists and functionalists have argued that intensive and face-to-face 
interaction between state agents lead to the development of common identities and roles, and 
a shift towards a greater alignment with the IGO (Deutsch, 1957). Internalization and social 




learning of roles occur through intensive repetition of role and action. Direct experiences of 
IEs increase the likelihood that civil servants evoke roles and behavior consistent with shared 
norms and values of the IEs (the logic of primacy). Jean Monnet believed that “men are 
changed by what they do” (quoted in Duchène, 1994, 376). 
 
There may be clear and less clear boundary policing between organizations (Johnston, 2003). 
Actor interaction across organizational boundaries affects their perceptions of the 
permeability of these borders. For example, Commission officials may have intensive contacts 
with domestic officials and with OECD and WTO officials who work on similar issues. The 
argument is that boundaries that are perceived as unclear invoke ambiguous cues for action 
and role enactment. In such circumstances the logic of recency is likely to be guiding actors’ 
roles and behavior. On the other hand, the clearer the perceived boundaries are between IEs 
and other institutions, the more likely that the logic of primacy is evoked.  
 
H5: Demographic characteristics 
Finally, organizations are composed of actors with demographic characteristics (e.g. 
education, tenure, age and nationality) that may guide actors’ enactment of behavior and role 
perception. Assumable, the demographic profiles of officials are likely to penetrate their 
behavior in weakly organized and institutionalized situations. This argument gives the 
following “prediction”: Ceteris paribus, highly educated civil servants within porous expert 
organizations are more likely to evoke roles as independent sector experts than roles as 
national representatives (Cortell and Peterson, 2003, 6). Moreover, IE officials with an 
international education and with a multinational family background are more likely to be 
supranationally oriented than officials with mainly a national education and family. This is 
due to their parental and educational pre-socialization prior to entering the IEs. Ceteris 




paribus, young IE civil servants are more likely to become supranationally and 
transgovernmentally oriented than older civil servants who have been subject to domestic pre-
socialization over longer periods of time. Finally, the tenure of civil servants is likely to 
mould their decision-making behavior. Arguably, senior IE officials with life-long service are 
more likely to evoke supranational and transgovernmental behavior and roles than newly 
recruited IEs officials (Mourtizen, 1990, 44). Findings suggest that loyalty towards any IE is 
assumed to be a function of the IE officials’ length of service (see H3) (Reinalda and 
Verbeek, 2004, 20). 
 
A METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 
The analysis presented below illustrates how the five independent variables affect the role and 
behavior of IE personnel. A systematic and critical test of the five independent variables 
warrants comparative data sets not yet available. Hence, the main purpose of the next section 
is merely to illustrate the “predicted” relationships between the five hypotheses and the 
behavioral dynamics among IE incumbents. The next section thus has modest explorative 
ambitions and does not give a systematic variable-by-variable test. The following discussion 
is empirically suggestive and illustrative, and benefits from secondary empirical material on 
seconded officials from different EU member-states and Norway (CLENAD, 2003; EFTA 
Secretariat, 2000; Smith, 1973; Smith, 2001; Statskontoret, 2001, 17). These data are 
supplemented by primary empirical observations from one research project on OECD officials 
(Marcussen, 2002) and one research project on national civil servants attending EU 
committees – the Commission expert committees, the comitology committees and the Council 
working groups (Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal, 2003).  
  
EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 




The European Commission 
The European Commission, located in Brussels, is the core executive body at the heart of the 
EU. It houses about 20 000 officials, is vertically specialized into eight grades, headed by a 
collegium of Commissioners, and it is horizontally specialized according to purpose and 
function into 23 semi-autonomous Directorate Generals (DGs), a number of internal and 
general services, and several hundred Units. In several regards the Commission mirrors the 
functional and process organization of national executive bodies (Egeberg and Trondal, 1999; 
Lequesne, 2000; Stevens and Stevens, 2001, 166) (H1).  
 
Despite the existence of several competing dynamics within the Commission, balancing 
between institutional autonomy and dependence on the member-states (Christiansen, 1997; 
Lequesne, 2000), this institution exhibits a strong supranational and transgovernmental modus 
operandi. Previous studies indicate an integral supranational identity among Commissioners 
and top Commission bureaucrats. A Study by Egeberg (2004) indicates that the College of 
European Commissioners is first and foremost governed by their sector portfolio interests 
(H1) and less by their external party belongings and country of origin. However, more 
intergovernmental dynamics strive constantly for attention within the Commission apparatus, 
for example, concerning budgetary matters and personnel policy (Egeberg, 2004; Hooghe, 
2001; Kassim and Menon, 2004). Intergovernmental dynamics reflect partly the national 
origins of the Commission officials (H5) and partly elements of territorial organization within 
the Commission services, primarily at the Commissioner and Cabinet levels (Egeberg, 2003c; 
Egeberg and Trondal, 1999) (H1). By contrast, transgovernmental dynamics reflect the 
functional organization of the Commission DGs and Units and the professional expertise of 
the officials (H1). 
 




The role perceptions and decision-making behavior of Commission officials is foremost 
accounted for by considering their sectoral Commission portfolios (Nugent, 2001). Moreover, 
functional roles and behavioral patterns in the Commission can be accounted for by 
considering the close interaction that Commission officials have with sectorally organized 
institutions outside the Commission, such as domestic sector ministries, industry and interest 
organizations (H4). Moreover, Egeberg (2003b) argues that sector roles and decision-making 
behavior among Commission officials may reflect their recruitment to the Commission. He 
shows that top Commission officials are recruited on the basis of merit and not on the basis of 
national flags, accompanying sectoral behavior that is closely associated with their 
Commission portfolio (H3). The meritocratic system is recently enhanced in the Staff 
Regulations with respect to internal promotion (Coull and Lewis, 2003). However, the merit 
principle is indeed challenged by recent and current enlargements of the Union (Kassim and 
Menon, 2004, 19; Stevens and Stevens, 2001, 95). Upholding a geographical balance of A-
grade civil servants through secondment contracts may serve the purpose of upholding 
national allegiances among newly recruited top Commission officials from the new member-
countries (H3).  
 
Studies show that the horizontal specialization of IEs affects the role perceptions of the 
incumbents (e.g. Bennet and Oliver, 2002, 426). In the Commission the DG and Unit level are 
important carriers of identification and decision-making premises, partly due to low inter-DG 
mobility of personnel (Cini, 1996; McDonald, 1997). For example, decision-making within 
DG Trade is done by relatively small groups of policy experts (Woolcock, 2000, 394). 
Intensive in-group interaction is conducive to the emergence of in-group identifications, as 
was the case within Monnet’s own circle of advisors (Duchêne, 1994). Similarly, Cini (1997, 
86) observes that the identities of the statuary staff of former DG Competition and 




Environment are directed more towards the DG level than towards the Commission at large. 
Hence, the horizontal organization of the Commission affects the role perceptions of the 
incumbents (H1). However, the Commission also exhibit intergovernmental logics. Egeberg 
(1996) shows that national allegiances are strongly emphasized by seconded Commission 
officials. These allegiances may be accounted for by considering their non-merit based 
recruitment to the Commission services (Hooghe, 2001) (H3).  
 
There is one under-researched ‘Cinderella’ of the European Commission where 
intergovernmental dynamics may have ample chances of survival and viability: the parallel 
administration of seconded national civil servants (Trondal, 2004). Arguably, the emergence 
of supranational and transgovernmental behavior and roles among seconded Commission 
officials is indicative of the socializing power of the Commission writ large (Wolf, 1973, 
365). According to the White Paper on European Governance issued by the Commission in 
2001, “exchange of staff and joint training between administrations at various levels would 
contribute to a better knowledge of each other’s policy objectives, working methods and 
instruments” (European Commission, 2001, 13). This parallel administration was of 
paramount importance in the formative years of the Commission and will be extended 
substantially with the recent EU enlargement. The Commission has estimated a need of about 
4000 new recruits from the new member-countries, mostly hired to non-permanent posts 
(Trondal, 2004) (H3). 
 
Seconded national civil servants are heavily “pre-packed” and pre-socialized when entering 
the Commission. Their stay at the Commission is relatively short and the majority returns to 
prior positions in national ministries or agencies when their temporary contracts come to an 
end. Seconded personnel also remain paid by their employer at the national level when 




working for this supranational executive (CLENAD, 2003; Statskontoret, 2001). 
Consequently, the Commission should be considered a secondary institution to most 
secondêes. One should therefore expect these officials to be reluctant Europeans and hesitant 
to enact supranational roles while working for the Commission (cf. Lewis, 2003) (H3 and 
H4). 
 
An early study of 36 former seconded Dutch officials to the Commission revealed that all of 
them retained a national loyalty when working in the Commission and “none indicated that 
[they] had ever come into conflict of loyalty” (Smith, 1973, 565). A later study of seconded 
officials from the Scottish Office of the UK central administration to the European 
Commission supports these arguments (Smith, 2001). Smith (2001) also observes that 
seconded officials reinforce their national administrative cultures and allegiances rather than 
becoming more supranationally oriented during their stay at the Commission. Similarly, 
studies of EU committees demonstrate that national officials attending EU committees evoke 
national roles more strongly than supranational and transgovernmental roles (Egeberg, 
Schaefer and Trondal, 2003). However, supranational allegiances are strengthened subsequent 
to intensive interaction within EU institutions (Trondal, 2003) (H2). However, studies also 
indicate that supranational and transgovernmental roles among seconded Commission 
officials reflect a pre-socialization dynamic at the domestic level prior to entering the 
Commission (Page, 1997, 60) (H4). 
 
According to Cini (1996, 121), “the appointment of temporary staff encourages an 
intermingling of national and European administrators which itself has the potential to 
provoke a sort of process of Europeanisation at the national and sub-national levels”. 
Moreover, seconded Commission officials are sector experts who work in highly sector-




specialized task roles within their respective DGs. Moreover, these roles fit well-known roles 
from national ministries and agencies (H4). According to a survey conducted by the EFTA 
Secretariat (2000, 1) among 18 Norwegian national experts to the Commission, “all but one 
had been working in the same unit during their contract period”.  These factors help explain 
why seconded Commission officials retain sectoralized roles and develop transgovernmental 
role perceptions and modes of action. 
 
The OECD Secretariat 
The OECD was established in Paris on 30 September 1961. It included eighteen European 
countries, United States and Canada and replaced the OEEC, which administered the US-
funded Marshall aid to European reconstruction. The official purpose of the OECD is to 
assure growth and employment in member as well as non-member-countries while 
maintaining financial stability. In order to reach this goal, the organization consistently works 
for trade and capital liberalization worldwide. Another major goal is the coordination of 
economic aid to developing countries. 
 
By 2003 the OECD has thirty members and its activity areas have gradually spread to include 
almost all aspects of relevance for economic, political and social governance in the member-
countries. This variety of activity is being dealt with in the over 200 committees and groups 
that provide the forums for informational exchange between national civil servants. Some 
committees like the Economic and Development Review Committee convene at least on a 
monthly basis. Others only rarely convene. Committees like the Economic Policy Committee 
and Working Party no.3 call together very senior civil servants from the member-states. 
Others have a more loose composition, which varies from meeting to meeting (H4) 
(Marcussen, 2002). 





The work in the committees is supported logistically and analytically by the OECD 
secretariat, which employs about 800 academic staff to which one should add no less than 500 
employed on an ad-hoc basis. A number of these short-term and project employed 
professionals are consultants paid by their member-state. To these numbers, one should add -
1.000 in other staff categories. The secretarial structure is a copy of the ministerial structure 
known from the member-states. It is horizontally organized into 11 issue-specific directorates, 
including directorates that deal with science and trade (H1). The Economics Department is by 
far the largest directorate, both with regard to finances and personnel. Attached are also semi-
autonomous bodies such as the International Energy Agency. The Secretary General outlines 
the main objectives and strategies of the OECD and is also in charge of the daily secretarial 
business. The work of the secretariat results in a large number of analytical and statistical 
publications. 
 
The OECD does not produce hard law that is directly applicable in the member-countries, 
such as the European Union. Nor does it dispense money like for instance the International 
Monetary Fund. The OECD is best known for its production of comparable data and analyses. 
One could argue that the main purpose of the OECD with its highly skilled Secretariat is to 
function as an ideational artist. In that capacity the OECD was supposed to think the 
unthinkable and to play around with new and challenging concepts. With a view to improve 
the general macro-economic and political climate in the member-countries, the OECD was 
also supposed to form a forum in which national high level representatives could enter into 
constructive dialogue (H4). In that capacity the OECD should act as an ideational arbitrator 
that helps initiate a common learning process in the national public administrations. 
Consequently, the OECD today welcomes more than 40.000 national civil servants in its 




committees on an annual basis, thereby allowing for direct policy deliberation with a view to 
developing a common scheme of reference across national boundaries. Through moral 
suasion and continuous multilateral surveillance OECD civil servants as well as the large 
number of civil servants seconded from the member-states evoke transgovernmental and 
supranational roles and identities (H3 and H4) (Marcussen, 2002).  
 
It has been argued that the OECD to a large extent acts as a trend-follower rather than a trend-
setter (Marcussen, 2002). Consequently, the OECD, in competition with other IGOs, tends to 
reformulate existing trends and solutions in order to gain political legitimacy in the member-
states. The OECD is presently preparing to welcome a large number of new member-
countries from Central and Eastern Europe. This will challenge the dominant view and self-
perception of the OECD as the rich-countries’ club. For all these reasons it has been argued 
that the OECD is currently in an acute identity crisis with its purpose and direction badly 
understood. 
 
In favor of an intergovernmental dynamic within the OECD Secretariat would count the 
organizational affiliation to member-states (H4), the de facto recruitment procedures (H3) and 
the low degree of institutionalization (H2). OECD personnel are not formally recruited on 
basis of their country of origin. Ideally, only merit counts in recruitment situations. However, 
as in most other IGOs the recruitment praxis in the OECD Secretariat favors certain 
nationalities at the expense of others. This means that the question of nationality also counts 
in the framework of the OECD. As a general pattern, compared to their budgetary 
contribution, the big member-states (France is the significant exception) are underrepresented 
among the OECD employees and the small countries are overrepresented. Overall, however, 




the size of the member-country correlates with the number of OECD civil servants with origin 
in that country (H3).  
 
An additional factor that talks in favor of a distinct intergovernmental dynamic within the 
OECD secretariat is the fact that the average seniority of OECD civil servants is only four 
years (H5). It seems that the average OECD civil servant consider the OECD post as being 
one step among others in a distinct national career since most return to their home countries 
after OECD employment. Given the large number of seconded personnel among the OECD 
civil servants, the short tenure of the average OECD civil servant and the fact that the large 
majority of OECD civil servants are employed on time-limited contracts, one could argue that 
it is possible to define the entire OECD secretariat as a parallel administration in the sense 
described above (H3 and H5). Finally, since the OECD secretariat, compared to the European 
Commission, is not primarily engaged in the production of hard law relatively few standard 
operating procedures and fixed mandates exist in the OECD Secretariat. The number of 
directly binding OECD decisions and international agreements is low and typically 
concentrated within very few issue areas. The OECD flexibly engages in the collection, 
transformation and diffusion of OECD-wide norms. This it does through various soft-law 
mechanisms, of which regular peer-review and surveillance is notorious (Marcussen, 2004a). 
 
Other factors, however, may trigger a transgovernmental dynamic within the OECD 
secretariat. In general, the average OECD A-grade civil servant is well educated within his or 
her discipline (Marcussen, 2004b). S/he has yearlong professional experience within that 
discipline either from other IGOs or from their country of origin (H5). Furthermore, the 
OECD civil servant will be officially encouraged and rewarded to participate in and 
contribute to international academic conferences and scientific journals and reports. A 




frequently evoked reason for working within the OECD Secretariat is the possibility of 
exploiting ones own professional curiosity. In this way, OECD civil servants tend to have 
strong loyalties towards specific issue areas and fields of expertise, such as research and trade. 
 
Finally, some factors encourage the development of a supranational dynamic within the 
OECD Secretariat. As mentioned, the very raison d’être of the OECD is to make a decisive 
difference for the way national civil servants think and perceive of problems and solutions. 
The OECD itself is in the transformation business, i.e. it is engaged in the construction of 
world-views and perceptions among national civil servants. In some committees and some 
sectors outward-directed socialization practices may be more efficient that in others (Lerdell 
and Sahlin-Andersson, 1997; Marcussen, 2004c; Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). The effectiveness 
of such socialization may depend on the techniques applied by the OECD, such as 
information, deliberation, and peer-pressure (Zürn, 2003). It may also depend on the extent to 
which a unified, coherent and institutionalized OECD ideology has developed (H2). If it is 
possible to identify a certain OECD-way of doing things it will, ceteris paribus, be more 
likely that learning by OECD civil servants is unidirectional, harmonious and goal-directed 
(H2). An additional factor that speaks in favor of supranational dynamics in the OECD 
Secretariat is the fact that this Secretariat to an increasing extent has developed coherent 
strategies with regard to third countries. Thus, the OECD Secretariat, through its multiple 
outreach activities, is heavily engaged with non-member-countries with a view to assist, 
instruct, monitor, survey and supervise these (Marcussen, forthcoming). Such unified action 
towards the outside world may strengthen the development of a distinct OECD identity (H4). 
 
The WTO Secretariat 




The WTO Secretariat, located in Geneva, has around 550 regular staff and is headed by a 
Director-General. It is horizontally specialized into nineteen functional divisions (much like 
the European Commission), two divisions with information and liaison tasks and three 
divisions with support roles. The Secretariat is vertically specialized and the divisions are 
headed by a Director who reports to a Deputy-Director General or directly to the Director 
General (H1). The Secretariat supports and assists the WTO members during the day-to-day 
operation of the WTO agreements, during dispute settlements, and during trade negotiations. 
The Secretariat’s main duties is to supply technical and professional support for the various 
councils and committees of the WTO, to provide technical assistance to developing countries, 
to monitor and analyze developments in world trade, to provide information to the public and 
the mass media and to organize the ministerial conferences. The Secretariat also provides 
legal assistance in the dispute settlement process and advises governments wishing to become 
members of the WTO.  
 
We ask how officials of the WTO Secretariat perceive their own roles as employees of the 
Secretariat. It is assumed that the configuration of different role perceptions evoked by WTO 
officials has consequences for which actors, what kind of information and what networks are 
brought into the WTO decisions. Thus, the behavior and role perceptions of the officials of 
the WTO Secretariat may affect the dynamics of the WTO as a whole. WTO officials are 
recruited from the member-states, but do they perceive themselves to be national 
representatives (H3 and H4)? They are mainly educated in economy, trade policy and law, but 
do they perceive themselves to be primarily professional experts (H5)? They are employed by 
the WTO and are supposed to be loyal to this organization, but do they perceive themselves to 
be primarily WTO officials? The seminal study of Cox and Jacobson (1973) demonstrated 
that officials with long tenure in IEs tend to develope identifications with it (H5).  





According to WTO’s internal rules, the Secretariat has no formal decision-making power. 
Hence, the Secretariat does not have autonomous supranational authority. However, the 
relatively small Secretariat is involved in most of the work of the WTO and is essential for the 
functioning of the organization. Vacancies are the subject of open competition and advertised 
by means of vacancy notices, the distribution of which is made to all official representatives 
of the WTO (H3). Those attending the Secretariat possess post-graduate university degrees 
with an emphasis on trade issues (H5). The academic qualifications are often supplemented 
by at least five years of experience in national governments, IGOs, or other organizations or 
enterprises dealing with issues of trade policy and international trade relations. Thus, the 
officials have a variety of former institutional affiliations (H4). However, the professional 
staff consists primarily of economists and lawyers specialized in international trade policy 
(Yi-chong and Weller, 2004). The professionals seem to share “a core set of normative 
principles, practical know-how, scientific beliefs….” (Schemeil, 2004, 82). Hence, WTO 
officials have strong professional and sectoral affiliations – reflecting their educational 
backgrounds and their prior employment in other IGOs, enterprises or other organizations as 
well as in domestic sector ministries (H4 and H5). The average tenure among WTO officials 
is long because the transition from the GATT to the WTO “did not bring about significant 
changes in its Secretariat in terms of its personnel…” (Yi-chong and Weller, 2004, 5). This 
fact has strengthened a community of personnel and a consensus culture among WTO 
officials (H2 and H5). However, this practice of consensus is also brought about by the sheer 
substantive complexity of the issues dealt with among WTO officials. Shared professional 
knowledge seems to create a sense of belonging among the officials (H1 and H5) (Yi-chong 
and Weller, 2004, 6). 
 




Intergovernmental, supranational and transgovernmental roles are not mutually exclusive. On 
the contrary, these roles are likely to play out in different organizational contexts. 
Furthermore, although WTO officials do not have formal decision-making power, they 
nevertheless are important in gathering, administering and processing information. Hence, 
they are important both as premise providers and in preparing decisions made by the member-
states. However, at present there is a lack of empirical observations that may illuminate the 
mix of organizational dynamics underpinning the WTO Secretariat. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Westphalian logic of territorial sovereignty is challenged more by some IGOs than by 
others. The intergovernmental logic of territoriality seems less salient in the European Union 
than in the OECD and the WTO. However, we cannot conclude that the same pattern is valid 
for the IEs of these IGOs. The mix of behavioral and role dynamics evolving within IEs are 
organizationally contingent and more complex than assumed by IR theoretical orthodoxy. IE 
officials are expected to perform increasingly more complex tasks of representation. The 
organizational approach suggested here has unpacked the organizational components of IEs in 
order to understand their nuts and bolts. Different behavioral logics are played out in the EU 
Commission, the WTO Secretariat and the OECD Secretariat due to different organizational 
properties (H1), different levels of institutionalization (H2), different recruitment procedures 
(H3), different organizational affiliations towards external organizations (H4), and different 
demographic characteristics among the personnel (H5). Nevertheless, due to similarities as 
well as differences on these variables (Table 2), these IEs seem to share important behavioral 
dynamics.  
 




The empirical observations presented in this study indicate that supranational dynamics are 
associated with long tenure among IE officials (H5) and a high intensity of actor-interaction 
among IE officials who have the IE as their primary institutional affiliation (H4). 
Supranationally oriented IE officials are also typically recruited on the basis of merit into 
permanent positions (H3). The WTO case also demonstrates that supranational dynamics may 
emanate from the issue specificity of IEs (H1). Highly specialized professionals seem to 
create a special loyalty that disregards national borders (H5). The analysis gives less clear-cut 
findings on how organizational properties (H1) and degrees of institutionalization (H2) are 
associated with supranational dynamics. Finally, this study indicates that transgovernmental 
dynamics are fostered by the vertical specialization and the horizontal sector-specialization of 
IEs (H1), by the meritocratic recruitment procedure (H3) and by the existence of a highly 
educated professional staff (H5). 
 
A next pertinent question is how the internal dynamics of IEs affect domestic government 
institutions. What happens when strongly institutionalized domestic executives and strongly 
pre-socialized civil servants become locked into the organizational machinery of IEs? Are we 
indeed witnessing the emergence of a transformative international bureaucracy with an 
autonomous power towards supranationalism and transgovernmentalism? Or do we observe 
merely incremental institutional adjustments within the existing Westphalian order of 
territorial executive governance? Our analysis indicates that IEs are indeed complex, 
multifaceted and marble cake-like organizations with strong transgovernmental and 
supranational dynamics.  
 
 





Three role perceptions 
Role perception  
(i) Intergovernmental (ii) Supranational (iii) Transgovernmental 
Role ideal State-identity IE-identity Expert-identity 
Role base Territorial base Community base Own educational 
background and expertise 
Driving force ‘What is my state’s 
interest’? 
‘What is the common 
good’? 























Correlates of organizational characteristics in International Executives: 






H1  Organizational properties: 
- vertical specialization 
- horizontal specialization 
 
Highest 








By purpose and 
process 
H2 Institutionalization High Low Medium 







H4 Organizational affiliations: 
- primary/secondary affiliations 
 

















H5 Organizational demography: 
- Education and professional 
background 



















                                                 
1 This article is part of a project entitled “DISC: Dynamics of International Secretariats”. The financial support 
of the Joint Committee of the Nordic Social Science Research Councils and the CONNEX network at MZES is 
gratefully acknowledged. A previous draft was presented at the 12th. Annual Conference in Political Science, 
Tromsø, Norway, 11-13 January 2004. The authors are indebted to comments from the conference participants, 
Torbjörn Larsson, Martha Finnemore, Morten Egeberg and two anonymous referees.  
2 For simplicity reasons, we use the term International Governmental Organization (IGO) to describe the OECD, 
the WTO, as well as the European Union. These three organizations all have nation-states as their members. 
Nevertheless, the European Union in particular is also recognized to be much more than just an 
intergovernmental organization (e.g. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998). 
3 In the EU Christiansen (2001, 49) demonstrate the increased ’actorness’ of the Council Secretariat, particularly 
within the field of CFSP. Studies also show that the Commission’s power of initiative tends to be weakened 
during turbulent institutional periods, for example during the Enlargement process and the Convention process 
(e.g. Sverdrup 2000). 
4 Among the puzzling observations is the fact that the volume of institutional change within the European Union 
seems larger than the corresponding volume of institutional change within the member-states (Wessels, Maurer 
and Mittag, 2003). Hence, transformational processes at the nation-state level seem imperfectly associated with 
transformational changes at the EU level. 
 
REFERENCES 
Aberback, J.D. (2003) ‘Introduction: Administration in an Era of Change’, Governance 16 
(3): 315-319. 
Aggestam, L. (1999) ‘Role Conceptions and the Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy’, 
ARENA working paper, No. 8. 
Alderson, K. (2001) ‘Making sense of state socialization’, Review of International Studies 27 
(3): 415-433. 




                                                                                                                                                        
Alger, C. (1963) ‘United Nations Participation as a Learning Experience’, Public Opinion 
Quarterly Fall: 425-440. 
Andersson, J.J. (2002) ‘Europeanization and the Transformation of Democratic Polity, 1945-
2000’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (5): 793-822.  
Barnett, M. (1993) ‘Institutions, Rules, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System’, 
International Studies Quarterly 37: 271-296. 
Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. (1999) ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations’, International Organization 53 (4): 699-733. 
Bekke, H.A.G.M and van der Meer, F.M. (eds.) (2000) Civil Service Systems in Western 
Europe, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Bennett, A.L. and Oliver, J.K. (2002) International Organizations. Principles and Issues, 
Seventh Edition. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
Beyers, J. and Trondal, J. (2004) ‘How Nation-States ‘Hit’ Europe - Ambiguity and 
Representation in the European Union’, West European Politics 27 (forthcoming). 
Biersteker, T.J. (2003) ‘State, Sovereignty and Territory’, in W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B.A. 
Simmons (eds.) Handbook of International Relations, London: SAGE. 
Brunsson, N. and Jacobsson, B. (eds.) (2000) A World of Standards, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. (1998) ‘Organizing for Europe: Whitehall, The British State and 
European Union’, Public Administration Vol. 76: 601-628. 
Checkel, J.T. (2003) ‘”Going Native” in Europe? Theorizing Social Interaction in European 
Institutions’ Comparative Political Studies 36 (1-2): 209-231. 




                                                                                                                                                        
Christiansen, T. (1996) ‘A maturing bureaucracy? The role of the Commission in the policy 
process’, in J. Richardson (ed.) European Union. Power and Policy-Making, London: 
Routledge.  
Christiansen, T. (1997) ‘Tensions of European governance: politicized bureaucracy and 
multiple accountability in the European Commission’, Journal of European Public Policy 4 
(1): 73-90. 
Christiansen, T. (2001) ‘The Council of Ministers: the politics of institutionalised 
intergovernmentalism’, in J. Richardson (ed.) European Union. Power and Policy-Making, 
London: Routledge.  
Cini, M. (1996) The European Commission. Leadership, organisation and culture in the EU 
administration, Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Cini, M. (1997) ‘Administrative Culture in the European Commission: The Cases of 
Competition and Environment’, in N. Nugent (ed.) At the Heart of the Union. Studies of the 
European Commission, Houndmills, Macmillan Press. 
CLENAD (2003) Report of the Working Group ‘Life after SNE’, Brussels. 
Coull, J. and Lewis, C. (2003) ‘The Impact of Reform of the Staff Regulations in Making the 
Commission a More Modern and Efficient Organisation: An Insider’s Perspective’, 
EIPASCOPE, No. 3. 
Cowles, M. G., Caporaso, J. and Risse, T. (eds.) (2001) Transforming Europe: 
Europeanization and Domestic Change, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 




                                                                                                                                                        
Cox, R.W. and Jacobson, H.K. (1973) The Anatomy of Influence. Decision Making in 
International Organizations, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Deutsch, K. et al. (1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International 
Organization in the Light of Historical Experience, Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Duchêne, F. (1994) Jean Monnet. The First Statesman of Interdependence, New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company. 
EFTA Secretariat (2001) Evaluation of arrangements with secondments, 4/FE/W/008, 2 
Annexes, Brussels. 
Egeberg, M. (1996) ‘Organization and Nationality in the European Commission Services’, 
Public Administration 74 (4): 721-735. 
Egeberg, M. (2003a) ‘How Bureaucratic Structure Matters: An Organizational Perspective’, 
in B.G. Peters and J. Pierre (eds.) Handbook of Public Administration, London: SAGE. 
Egeberg, M. (2003b) ‘Organising institutional autonomy in a political context: Enduring 
tensions in the European Commission’s development’, paper presented at the ARENA 
Research Conference “Institutional Dynamics and Democracy in the EU”, 3-4 October 2003, 
Oslo. 
Egeberg, M. (2003c) ‘The European Commission’, in M. Cini (ed.) European Union Politics, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Egeberg, M. (2004) ‘Executive Politics as Usual: Role behaviour and conflict dimensions in 
the College of European Commissioners’, unpublished paper, ARENA. 




                                                                                                                                                        
Egeberg, M. Schaefer, G.F. and Trondal, J. (2003) ‘The Many Faces of EU Committee 
Governance’, West European Politics 26 (3): 19-40. 
Egeberg, M. and Trondal, J. (1999) ‘Differentiated integration in Europe: the case of the EEA 
country Norway’, Journal of Common Market Studies 37 (1): 133-142. 
Ernst, M. (1978) ‘Attitudes of diplomats at the United Nations: the effects of organizational 
participation on the evaluation of the organization’, International Organization 32 (4): 1037-
1044. 
European Commission (2000) Towards a European Research Area. Com (2000) 6, Brussels. 
European Commission (2001) European Governance, White Paper. Com (2001) 428 final. 
Brussels. 
Finnemore, M. (1996) National Interests in International Society, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 
International Organization 52 (4): 887-917. 
Flora, P., Kuhnle, S. and Urwin, D. (eds.) (1999) State Formation, Nation-Building and Mass 
Politics in Europe. The Theory of Stein Rokkan, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gehring, T. (2003) ‘International Institutions as Decision-making Systems. Lessons from the 
European Union’, paper presented at the 8th. Biennial International Conference of the 
European Studies Association, Nashville, Tennessee, 27-29 March 2003. 
Gould, D.J. and Kelman, H.C. (1970) ‘Horizons of Research on the International Civil 
Service’, Public Administration Review 30 (3): 244-251. 




                                                                                                                                                        
Gourevitch, P. (2003) ‘Domestic Politics and International Relations’, in W. Carlsnaes, T. 
Risse and B.A. Simmons (eds.) Handbook of International Relations, London: SAGE. 
Greenwood, R. and Hinings, C.R. (1996) ‘Understanding Radical Organizational Change: 
Bringing together the old and the new institutionalism’, Academy of Management Review 21 
(4): 1022-1054. 
Gulick, L. (1937) ‘Notes on The Theory of Organizations. With Special References to 
Government in the United States’, in L. Gulick and L.F. Urwick (eds.) Papers on the Science 
of Administration, New York: Institute of Public Administration, Columbia University. 
Haas, E.B. (1990) When Knowledge is Power. Three Models of Change in International 
Organizations, Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Haas, P. (1992) ‘Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, 
International Organization 46 (1): 1-35. 
Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P. and Rittberger, V. (1996) ‘Interests, Power, Knowledge: The 
Study of International Regimes’, Mershon International Studies Review 40: 177-228. 
Hooghe, L. (2001) The European Commission and the Integration of Europe. Images of 
Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ingraham, P.W. (1995) The Foundation of Merit. Public Service in American Democracy, 
Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press. 
Johnston, A.I. (2003) ’Conclusions and Extensions: Beyond Europe and Towards Mid-Range 
Theorizing’, unpublished paper, Harvard University. 




                                                                                                                                                        
Kassim, H. and Menon, A. (2004) ‘European Integration since the 1990s: Member States and 
the European Commission’, paper presented at an ARENA seminar, 11 February 2004. 
Kegley, C.W. and Raymond, G.A. (2002) Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia. Building 
World Order in the new Millennium, Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
Knight, J. (1970) ‘On the influence of the Secretary-General: Can we know what it is?’, 
International Organization 24 (3):594-600. 
Kratochwil, F. and Ruggie, J.G. (1986) ‘International Organizations: a state of the art and an 
art of the state’, International Organization 40 (4): 753-775. 
Lemoine, J. (1995) The International Civil Servant. An Engangered Species, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International. 
Lequesne, C. (2000) ‘The European Commission: A Balancing Act between Autonomy and 
Dependence’, in K. Neunreither and A. Wiener (eds.) European Integration After Amsterdam. 
Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lerdell, D. and Sahlin-Andersson, K. (1997) Att lära över gränser. En studie av OECD:s 
förvaltningspolitiska samarbete, SOU 1997:33. 
Lewis, J. (2000) ‘The methods of community in EU decision-making and administrative 
rivalry in the Council’s infrastructure’, Journal of European Public Policy 7 (2): 261-289. 
Lewis, J. (2003) ‘Informal integration and the supranational construction of the Council’, 
Journal of European Public Policy (Special Issue) 10 (6): 996-1019. 
March, J.G. (1994) A Primer on Decision Making. How Decisions Happen, New York: The 
Free Press. 




                                                                                                                                                        
March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1984) ‘The New Institutionalism. Organizational Factors in 
Political Life’, American Political Science Review 78: 734-749. 
March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1998) ‘The Institutional Dynamics of International Political 
Orders’, International Organization 52 (4): 943-969. 
Marcussen, M. (2002) OECD og idèspillet. Game over?, Copenhagen: Hans Reitzels Forlag. 
Marcussen, M. (2004a) ‘OECD Governancne Through Soft Law’, in U. Mörth (ed.) Soft Law 
in Governance and Regulation: An Interdisciplinary Analysis, Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar. 
Marcussen, M. (2004b) ‘The OECD as Ideational Artist and Arbitrator: Reality or Dream’? in 
B. Reinalda and B. Verbeek (eds.) Decision-Making Within International Organization,. 
London: Routledge. 
Marcussen, M. (2004c), ‘Multilateral Surveillance and the OECD: Playing the Idea-Game’ in 
K. Armingeon and M. Beyeler (eds.) The OECD and European Welfare States, Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar. 
Marcussen, M. (forthcoming) ‘The OECD as the Nanny of Democratic Governance in Central 
and Eastern Europe’, in T. Flockhart (ed.) Socialising Democratic Norms: The Role of 
International Organisations for the Construction of Europe, London: Palgrave (in 
preparation). 
McDonald, M. (1997) ‘Identities in the European Commission’, in N. Nugent (ed.) At the 
Heart of the Union. Studies of the European Commission, Houndmills: Macmillan Press. 




                                                                                                                                                        
Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina 
to Maastricht, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Mouritzen, H. (1990) The International Civil Service. A Study of Bureaucracy: International 
Organisations, Aldershot: Dartmouth. 
Nugent, N. (2001) The European Commission, Houndmills: Palgrave. 
Olsen, J.P. (2003a) ’The Many Faces of Europeanisation’, Journal of Common Market 
Studies 40 (5): 921-952. 
Olsen, J.P. (2003b) ‘Citizens, public administration and the search for theoretical 
foundations’, the 17th. Annual John Gaus Lecture, Americal Political Science Association, 29 
August 2003, Philadelphia PA. 
Page, E.C. (1997) People Who Run Europe, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Reinalda, B. and Verbeek, B. (2004) ‘The issue of decision-making within international 
organizations’, in B. Reinalda and B. Verbeek (eds.) Decision Making Within International 
Organizations, London: Routledge.  
Reymond, H. and Mailick, S. (1986) ‘The International Civil Service Revisited’, Public 
Administration Review 46 (2): 135-141. 
Risse, T. and Maier, M.L. (2003) Europeanization, Collective Identities and Public 
Discourses. Draft Final Report of the IDNET Thematic Network submitted to the European 
Commission. European University Institute and Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies. 




                                                                                                                                                        
Rochester, M.J. (1989) ‘The rise and fall of international organization as a field of study’, 
International Organization 40 (4): 777-813. 
Rokkan, S. (1987) Stat, nasjon, klasse, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
Rosenau, J.N. (1996) ‘Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy’, in J.A. Vasquez (ed.) 
Classics of International Relations, Third Edition. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. 
Rosenau, J.N. (1997) Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. Exploring Governance in a 
Turbulent World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sahlin-Andersson, K. (2000) ‘Arenas as Standardizers’, in N. Brunsson and B. Jacobsson et 
al. (eds.) A World of Standards, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. (1998) European Integration and Supranational 
Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schemeil, Y. (2004) ‘Expertise and political competence: consensus making within the Word 
Trade Organization and the World Meteorological Organization’, in B. Reinalda and B. 
Verbeek (eds.) Decision Making Within International Organizations, London: Routledge. 
Selznick, P. (1957) Leadership in Administration, New York: Harper & Son. 
Simon, H. (1957) Administrative Behavior, Second Edition. New York: Macmillan. 
Simmons, B.A. and Martin, L.L. (2003) ‘International Organizations and Institutions’, in W. 
Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B.A. Simmons (eds.) Handbook of International Relations, London: 
SAGE. 
Smith, J. (2001) ‘Cultural Aspects of Europeanization: The Case of the Scottish Office’, 
Public Administration 79 (1): 147-165. 




                                                                                                                                                        
Smith, K.A. (1973) ‘The European Economic Community and National Civil Servants of the 
Member States – A Comment’, International Organization 27: 563-568. 
Statskontoret (2001:17) Svenska nationalla experter i EU-tjänst, Stockholm. 
Stevens, A. and Stevens, H. (2001) Brussels Bureaucrats? The Administration of the 
European Union, London: Palgrave. 
Stone Sweet, A., Sandholtz, W. and Fligstein, N. (eds.) (2001) The Institutionalization of 
Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Sverdrup, U. (2000) ‘Precedents and Present Events in the European Union: An Institutional 
Perspective on Treaty Reform’, in . K. Neunreither and A. Wiener (eds.) European 
Integration After Amsterdam. Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Trondal, J. (2001) ‘Is there any Social Constructivist – Institutionalist Divide? Unpacking 
Social Mechanisms affecting Representational Roles among EU Decision-Makers’, Journal of 
European Public Policy 8 (1): 1-23. 
Trondal, J. (2003) ‘Transformasjon av staten. Hvilken betydning har EU?’, Norsk 
Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift 19 (1): 28-54.  
Trondal, J. (2004) ‘Political Dynamics of the Parallel Administration of the European 
Commission’, in A. Smith (ed.) Policies and the European Commission. Actors, 
interdependences, legitimacy, London: Routledge. 
Wagenen, R.V. (1971) ‘Observations on the Life of an International Civil Servant’, in R.S. 
Jordan (ed.) International Administration: Its Evolution and Contemporary Applications, 
London: Oxford University Press. 




                                                                                                                                                        
Wessels, W., Maurer, A. and Mittag, J. (eds.) (2003) Fifteen into one? The European Union 
and its member states, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Wolf, P. (1973) ‘International Organization and Attitude Change: A Re-examination of the 
Functionalist Approach’, International Organization 27 (3): 347-371. 
Woolcock, S. (2000) ‘European Trade Policy’, in H. Wallace and W. Wallace (eds.) Policy-
Making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Yi-chong, X. and P. Weller (2004) The Governance of World Trade. International Civil 
Servants and the GATT/WTO. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Zürn, M. (2003) ‘Getting socialized to build bridges. Socialization research between 
constructivism and rationalism’, unpublished paper, University of Bremen. 
 
 
